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I
SANCTIONS'. COUNTER-SANCTIONS! Behind the screaming headlines of
local papers stands the stark reality of economic interdependence. On the
one hand South Africa's dependent position vis-a-vis core areas is sharply
etched* notwithstanding the state's bravado. On the other hand* and more
pertinent for us here* lie the relationships that tie together economic
activity from the Copperbelt to Cape Agulhas. In relation to the latter it
is noti of course, simply the burgeoning weight of South African productive
activity that underpins the struggle over the resources and wealth of
southern Africa. For as is all too apparent to even the casual observer,
highly unequal exchanges within production labour, capital, and transport
networks pivot on the South African heartland of southern Africa. Even as
South African capital and the South African state stand in a subordinate
relationship to core areas of the world-economy, South African domination of
southern Africa remains no less evident and no less powerful.
By comparison to other areas of the world such a tightly imbricated set
of economic networks is quite distinctive: rarely do contiguous, non-core
states encompass such a circumscribed set of unequal economic relationships.
Certainly no "natural" or linear process of capital accumulation leads to
such an outcome. At the beginning of this century South Africa like its
neighbors confronted the world as a primary producer, with few significant
industrial production processes to demarcate itself from other peripheral
areas of the world. Yet the assumption of a natural path of regional
inequality and integration seems to exist within the literature on the
economic development of southern Africa. Despite the long-standing
predominance of South African economic forces across the area, and despite a
wide variety of studies on more narrowly circumscribed topics such as labour
migration, there is a notable lack of substantive attention to regional
political economy as a whole. Under the pressure of contemporary political
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acknowledged. Comments on earlier versions of the essay by Giovanni Arrighi,
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struggles this situation is now being reversed* particularly north of the
Limpopo. Yet studies of the Southern Africa Development Coordination
Conference and the effect of sanctions, for example* proceed from and address
the present situation; they understandably do not have as their aim or
purpose an explanation of the historical construction of regional
inequalities. If we ask such questions such as: "How did South Africa
escape from a peripheral position in the world-economy?" or "How did
"regional" interdependence emerge over time as part of this process?" there
are few if any answers.
This paper represents a modest attempt to redress this state of
affairs. In the following pages an examination is made of what is claimed to
have been a critical epoch in the emergence of southern Africa as a region of
the capitalist world-economy* namely the interwar period. Clearly this
period marked out the beginning of South Africa's industrial drive. Yet to
construe this as the natural creation of a national economy misses both the
driving forces that succeeded in effecting this transformation as well as its
meaning for southern Africa as a whole. In this latter area our basic claim
may be simply stated: it was during this phase of world-economic depression
and rivalry in the interstate system that initiatives by the South African
state succeeded in breaking the relationships that bound South Africa within
the peripheral zone of the world-economy. Out of this process would emerge
the basis for unequal exchange within southern Africa itself. Paradoxically
this process entailed a lessening of ties with surrounding territories* a
pattern to be reversed in the expansionary post-World War II years.
II
It is widely recognized that the early 1920s marked a period of crisis
in the relations within and among capital, labour and the state. The events
of the day are all too familiar: a crisis of profitability in the mining
sector, a strike wave culminating in the 1920 Black miners' strike and the
1922 White miners' strike, and a markedly adverse shift of market forces
against commercial agriculture as well as the nascent industrial sector that
had blossomed during the First World War. Out of these events came the Pact
government, shattering almost fifteen years of stability and common purpose
between capital and the state.
Far our purposes neither a replay of the convulsive events of the early
1920s nor an analysis of the shifting forces amongst capital and the state is
necessary* these have been well covered elsewhere. What is important to
grasp, however briefly* is the extent to which documented outbreaks of class
struggle and momentary reversals in price, supply and demand factors were but
indicators of much deeper malaise. At issue was no less than the viability
the premises that had underwritten over a half a century of capital
accumulation in South Africa.
From the opening years of the century onward there was little dispute
amongst both capital and the state regarding the proper role of southern
Africa in the world-economy. Following reconstruction after the Anglo-Boer
War, both-mining and agriculture expanded on the basis of full and open ties
to the capitalist world-economy. Such a path of local accumulation presumed
favorable access to expanding world markets for primary products, a process
underwritten throughout the nineteenth century under the Free Trade System
exercised through British hegemony. Great profits along the highly
competitive peripheral zone of the world-economy could be* and indeed were»
generated by following the primary production strategy. The early post-World
War I conjuncture revealed* however, that South African mining and
agriculture were, as a result of their commitment to this path, faced with
long-term structural difficulties.
It is a commonplace that the formation and development of South
Africa's great mining complexes were intricately bound to the forces of
international capital. Yet behind the common appellation of "international
monopoly capital" stood the structural reality of a peripheral production
process. Dependence upon core economic powers was high throughout the
circuit of mining accumulation, from the sourcing of investment funds,
through the provision of capital goods and technology, to a naked openness to
world commodity markets on both the input and outputs side of mining
production.
In the heady days of the Rand's birth these factors worked in mining
capital's favor, particularly as price deflation during the late nineteenth
century depression stimulated gold prospecting and production throughout the
world-economy.1 With the transition after the turn of the century to an
expansionary phase in the world-economy, these conditions changed slowly but
inexorably against mining capital. Most obvious was the scissors crisis
between a flat, internationally-fixed price for gold and inexorably rising
1
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costs of inputs on the world market, particularly after 1910. By the early
1920s the real value of gold had fallen by approximately 30 to 50 percent
from its value in the early years of the century, with the value of South
African gold shares suffering a similar fate.12 The judgement of
international finance on these trends was quite clear: despite increased
flows of investment capital from core to peripheral areas of the world-
economy in this period* capital investment in South Africa's gold mines
actually declined.3
In the opening decades of the century agriculture shared with mining
the process of a deepening integration into the world-economy. Yet here at
least the outcome was initially quite different. Far from constraining
accumulation* rising world prices opened up opportunities for the expansion
of commercial production and its extension into new areas. Critical areas of
agriculture such as wool had long been totally dependent on world prices and
marketing structures. Areas hitherto quite distant from full commercial
consideration now joined in this pattern. Of the latter none was more
important than maize production in the interior of the country, where
production quite early in the century expanded well beyond the boundaries of
local consumption towards international market. As Tim Keegan has argued*
"the crucial new variable was the opening up of export markets for maize*
which enabled farmers to grow unlimited quantities in the sure knowledge that
the internal price would be maintained at a profitable level.'"* By the early
post-World War I period up to a third of the crop was exported out of the
country.3 Looking at the first two decades of the century as a whole, rising
producer prices throughout the agricultural sector were thus matched by
rising production levels.
Where trends in agriculture crossed those in mining was in the
immediate post-World War I years. In the mining sector long-term structural
pressures came to a head, particularly as the "gold premium" was eliminated
and foreign investment dried up. Dire predictions of the end of the industry
E
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were matched by the closure of three mines, while 21 other mines were working
at a loss or at a profit of less than 2s. per ton.A In agriculture sharp
price reversals on the world market led many to fear for the long-term
prospects of the farming sector."7 As the Farmers Weekly of March 2f 1921
argued)
The South African farmer to-day CsicD is faced with the
difficulties of the present and doubts about the future... He
has made large commitments oh the basis of prices established for
farm produce when farm produce, too, shared in the general
inflation; he has to meet those commitments with realisations on
a greatly deflated market. No wonder he regards the future with
dismay, and turns hither and thither in search of a plank that
will bridge him over the gulf of ruin in his path.
Tracing the problem to its origins the author continued, "unfortunately the
fortunes of the farmer of this country, as regards his staple products* are
absolutely dependent upon the consuming capacity of the open markets of the
world".3 As in the case of mining, agriculture had become locked into a set
of markets which had turned against producers. As the citation suggests,
there was little local producers could do to effect relief from these
conditions.
South African primary producers were hardly alone in facing the chilly
winds blowing off the world market. Yet what gave particular emphasis to the
South African situation was not only the depth of the formal economic crisis,
particularly in mining, but accompanying class struggles. These were most
serious in mining, where attempts by mining capital to restore profitability
resulted in a strike wave by Black and White miners that culminated in the
well-known 1920 and 1922 upheavals. Agriculture's contribution in this
conjuncture was no less important. Here the greatest challenge to state and
capital was posed by the long-term transformation of South Africa's class
structure that accompanied the commercialisation of agriculture. Behind
rising production levels stood not only a deepening process of class struggle
in the countryside, but the generation of a large strata of unemployable and
* Leo Katzen, Gold and the South African Economy (Cape Town: A. A. Balkema,
196M, 29.
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yet politically-enfranchised Whites. By the early 1920s both accumulation
and the legitimacy of the political order were thus placed in danger.
Faced by this conjunctural crisis the South African state proved
increasingly unable to maintain acceptable levels of accumulation and the
social peace required to sustain the polity as a whole. Following the
state's open alliance with mining capital in the brutal events of 1922, the
path was opened to a new political.coalition in the 1924 elections. The
question for us here is simple: How did the Pact coalition move towards
effecting the transition to industrial production in its attempt to resolve
what may be called a crisis of peripheral development?
HI
The election of the Pact government signalled a new era in the
relationship between the state and the accumulation process. It soon became
apparent that the new government would seek a resolution of the country's
problems through the promotion of industrial production processes. Such a
course held forth the promise of not only new national centers of
accumulation to replace mining» but also the opportunity to quell White
labour militancy and resolve the "poor white" problem. State initiatives
soon ranged across a broad spectrum) from the reorganization of the transport
system* through the establishment of ISCGR, to attempts to extend the
autonomy of the Reserve Bank. Any fully adequate assessment of the
transformation of economic face of southern Africa would have to cover these
key areas. In the limited space available here we shall focus our attention
upon one critical domain: the restructuring of inter-sectoral and inter-
industry linkages through the regulation of commodity flows. Of all the
fronts the Pact acted upon none was so thoroughly swiftly tackled as that of
the regulation of commodity trade. Within one year of its election, the
government had reorganized policy-making bodies, carried forward an
investigation of tariff policy* and formulated and passed a revolutionary new
tariff. Such early action signalled to contemporaries both the shape of
things to come as well as the important role this area held in the struggle
to alter the pattern of South African economic activity.
Most accounts to date of these events focus upon the changing
relationship between "fractions" of capital, the state, and white workers.*9
* For direct examination of tariff policy see as examples Ralph Horwitz, The
Political Economy of South Africa (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson* 1967),
2<t5ff, and David Kaplan, "The Politics of Industrial Protection in South
Africa, 1910-1939" Journal of Southern African Studies, 3, li Oct. 1976, 70-
91., The famous debate in the late 1970s over state/capital/labour relations
also bears attention; see Review of African Political Economy) nos. 7 (1976)
Our interest is rather narrower* namely the extent to which such struggles
around state policy were directed at, and effected* radical transformations
in the networks that supported existing and prospective production processes.
In this realm the Pact was initially constrained by a wel1-entrenched set of
state agreements* institutions* and practices. From the earliest days of
colonial intrusion in the area that would become known as South Africa,
tariffs closely followed those of the dominant colonial power. The
transition from early nineteenth century British mercantilism, to mid-century
free trade* was fully reflected in changing colonial tariff schedules in
southern Africa.10 With the decline of British hegemony and heightened
imperialist rivalry in the late nineteenth century, changes in British policy
were once more imposed on colonial possessions. Free trade was to be
increasingly restricted within the Empire* particularly through the
application of preferential trade agreements.
In southern Africa these developments came to a head in the years
immediately after the Anglo-Boer War, when Britain confronted bitterly
antagonistic colonial governments which threatened the free flow of
commodities so essential to British domination of the mineral and
agricultural riches of the area. The solution was clear: to create a free
trade zone that would allow uninhibited and open flows of commodities across
the region and hence to and from Great Britain. This was achieved soon after
the war with the imposition of a customs union, including preferential duties
for British goods* among the Cape* Natal* the former Afrikaner Republics,
Basutoland, Southern Rhodesia, Swaziland, and Basutoland.
Continued inter-colonial squabbling, especially after the establishment
of Responsible Government in the Transvaal in 1907, seriously threatened the
existence of the customs union.11 One of the major impetuses behind the
creation of the Union of South Africa was precisely the advantages it offered
in ensuring the harmonious flow of commodities within and across its
constituent units. How this aim was achieved became apparent in the years
after 1910, as the new state turned its attention to organizing state policy
on a Union-wide basis.
and 11 (197B).
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 The best summary account, despite its angry anti-British cast, remains A.
J. Bruwers Protection in South Africa (Stellenbosch: Pro Ecclesia, 1923).
Bruwer later played a significant role in eliminating the colonial cast of
the tariff structure (see below).
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 Even within the Transvaal dissension existed on the customs union. See
the majority and minority reports of the Report of the Customs and Industries
Commission (Pretoria: Government and Printing and Stationery Office, 1908),
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aIn a world divided into primary producers and wealthy industrial
nations South Africa's place was all too clear. With the emergence of Union
nascent manufacturers turned their increasingly cohesive voices towards
rectifying this state of affairs, with particular attention directed towards
restructuring tariff policy. If-South Africa was to move into the industrial
league of nations, it was argued, concerted state action such as that
propelling the other Dominions' industrialisation would be required. At
first glance the new Union government under Botha and Smuts appeared to heed
the call for an industrial policy. The creation of the a Department of
Commerce and Industry was thus matched by the appointment of an investigatory
commission into trade and industry. Within five years however these
developments bore but bitter fruit. Despite the Commission's recommendation
that "adequate protection should be given to agricultural and industrial
undertakings!" its full report solidly advised against the pursuit of an
expanded industrial sector in the face of South Africa's small, widely-
dispersed home market* high levels of world competition, and the high cost of
labour.10 In short order the Department of Commerce and Industries was also
transformed into the Department of Mines and Industries) with the concerns of
industry severely subordinated in terms of staff and resources to the mining
sector. Manufacturersi led by the energetic W. J. Laite, quickly saw through
this course of events and launched a counter-attack, calling for a new
Department devoted to industry, a protective tariff, and a permanent tariff
board.13 All these efforts, however, came to nought.
With the advent of World War I and associated disruptions between South
African producers and overseas suppliers the issue of industrial policy was
reopened as the government appointed an honorary Industries Advisory Board.
It soon became clear, however, that the scope of the Board's mandate was to
be severely restricted: it was precluded from investigating the tariff
question and even touring the country to take evidence. Examination of
tariff matters did eventually take place, although the Board was warned in
private session by the Secretary of Mines and Industries that this was not an
area that the government considered open for new initiatives.1** Like the
ie
 Report of the Commission into the Conditions of Trade and Industries
(Pretoria: Government Printer, 1912), U.G. 10/12, IS.
1 3
 See for example W. J. Laite, The Union Tariff and its Relation to
Industrial and Agricultural Development. The Case for Manufacturers. (Cape
Town: South African Manufacturers Association, 1913).
** See the Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Tariff Committee of the
Board, National Archives Pretoria (henceforth NA), Board of Industry and
Science files (henceforth BIS), 410, 8.
report of the 1912 Commission, the Board's final report rejected any
significant aid to industry although it did propose the further investigation
of protection by a permanent and fully empowered Board.13 Weak as it was,
even this report was attacked by the Minister of Mines and Industries, F. S.
Ha 1 anf-and at no less a venue than the Annual Convention of the South African
Federated Chamber of Industries.1* Subsequent state actions in the tariff
field followed these well-established lines. Appointment of a new Board of
Trade and Industries was complete with severely restricted rights of inquiry,
a lack of any link to the manufacturing community, and admonitions by
Ministers that protection for industry was not to be considered.xv Board
members' subsequent threat to resign in the face of these difficulties led to
but minor enhancements of their power to take evidence.ia With the end of
World War I* and the reemergence of fierce competition from overseas
manufacturers, pressure to assist nascent manufacturers increased. Yet the
government held firm, rejecting the Board's recommendations of substantive
assistance to those industries, such as textiles and footwear, in most danger
of collapse.1V
The state's rigid commitment to primary production and free trade was
radically changed upon the election of the Pact government. Central here was
the reorganization of the Board of Trade and Industries. Instructed to
recast and revise the Union's customs tariff, the Board's powers were
considerably enhanced. Whereas its predecessor had but one fully salaried
member, the new Board had four full-time participants (A. J. Bruwer, M. H. de
Kock» F. J. Fahey, and H. E. S. Fremantle). Of the latter only one was
tarnished by ties with previous Boards <H. E. S. Fremantle) and he would
serve less than a year on the new Board. The Board's first report signalled
1 3
 Report of the Advisory Board of Industry and Science for the Year 1919.
(Cape Town: Government Printer, 1920). U.G. 42/20. Provisions in drafts of
the final report which met many of the demands of manufacturers were stripped
out by the time the final report was released; compare the final report with
draft materials contained in NA BIS 403, part III.
16
 As reported in the state journal, South African Journal of Industries
(henceforth SAJI), 3, July 1920, 610.
17
 See SAJI, 4, Sept. 1921, 722-27.
1B
 See their report "A survey of the powers and functions of the Board in
relation to the economic development of the Union," in NA BIS 355, as well as
SAJI, B, Jan. 1925, 30, and SAJI., 7, April 1924, 253-5.
lc?
 The boot and shoe industry is a good case in this regard. See H. J.
Choles, "The South African Boot and Shoe Industry, An Industry with Great
Possibilities in Danger of Extinction," SAJI, 4, March-April 1921, 206-17,
and the government's response in SAJI, 8, Jan. 1925, 30-47.
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the shape of things to come: it formed a vitriolic attack on Imperial
Preference, following the key lines of A. J. Bruwer's University of
Pennsylvania Ph.D. thesis.eo The Board's subsequent recommendations on
revising the tariff carried the argument to an expanded conclusion.E1 A two
schedule system of maximum and minimum rates was to be constructed* the
minimum rates applying to countries giving reciprocal privileges to the
Union. Not only was preference to be placed on a quid pro QUO basis for all
countries, but extensive protective duties were to be granted to
manufacturers and potential manufacturers. In addition the material inputs
of industrial production were to be placed in a special class of goods
subject to free entry or very low duties. The tariff act to be passed in
1925 followed these proposals in all essential details.
Reaction by capital to these fast-paced moves by the Board was equally
swift. Mining capital, having lost its privileged access to the state under
Botha and Smuts, nevertheless proceeded in time-honored patterns.
Representations to the Board reiterated arguments of the previous decade,
seeking to show "the adverse effect of a policy of protection on the two
great primary industries of South Africaj Agriculture and Mining".
Practically this took the form of demonstrating manufacturing's dependence on
the health of mining and agriculturei and in turn mining and agriculture's
dependence on free and open access to the world market. As the Chamber
argued)
Agriculture...like mining, must look to the markets of the world
for the sale of its products. In those markets protective duties
in South Africa will only hamper it: directly by increasing the
costs of all machinery, implements and stores generally used in
production! and indirectly by increasing the cost of labour
consequent on the increased cost of living.ES
e o
 See the Board of Trade and Industries, "South Africa and Imperial
Preference," Report No. 46 (Pretoria: Government Printer, Dec. 6
Bruwer's thesis had just been published in South Africa as Protection in
South Africa (Stellenbosch: Pro Ecclesia. 1953). The shift in the Board's
membership from business/state functionaries to those trained in academia
with few ties to capital or the previous government did not go unnoticed. As
the lion of commerce J. W. Jagger commentedi the Board's members were, "with
one exception* young and enthusiastic economists equipped with University
degrees but no business experience". See J. w1. Jagger, "The Board of Trade
and Industries," Journal of the Economic Society of South Africa, 1» S,
August 1927, 53.
e i
 Board of Trade and Industry, "Report No. 51, Report on the Revision of the
Customs Tariff together with the Proposed Customs Tariff Bill and the Revised
Customs Tariff*" (Cape Town: Government Printer, 1925).
e e
 Transvaal Chamber of Mines, "Statement of Evidence to the Board of Trade
and Industries on the Subject of a System of Protective Duties," Dec. 31,
1924. Contained in NA BTI 67/2.
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Buttressing such practical arguments was a plethora of arguments linking the
prosperity of the world and South Africa to a free trade sytemt.ea
Economists that they Here, Board members' attitudes to such preachings were
marked by cloaked hostility. Defending its treatment of the Chamber to the
Minister of Mines and Industries, the Board depicted the Chamber's
representations as an attack on the government:
The Chamber's Statement of Evidence proceeded on very general and
academic lines* and was in effect a treatise on the evils of
Protection. It contained copious quotations from the writings of
Marshall* the English Economist, and these were especially relied
upon to indicate that industrial protection must indubitably lead
to political corruption and the undermining of the State.st*
Whatever the impact of increased costs to the mining industry, the Board
hardly was to be swayed by such representations.
Appeals by the Chambers of Commerce, hitherto mining capital's natural
allies, did not fare much better. Yet the Chambers of Commerce were
themselves split between the Cape Chamber's pursuit of a policy of free trade
and preference for Britain, and the interior Chambers' growing sympathy for
industrial protection. These divisions reflected the different networks the
two parties relied upon, with the Cape representing the big import/export
houses tied to London, while commercial capital in the interior was much more
closely related to the growth of the domestic market and nascent
manufacturing. Bitter battles over tariff policy at the annual meetings of
ASSOCOM were common (most notably in 1916-17), and the prospect of
significant changes in state policy served to reopen old debates. At the
192^ Annual Congress of ASSOCOM a compromise position was reached whereby
recommendations for continued preference for Britain were matched by a very
restricted approval of protectionist measures.ea The lack of unity
nevertheless continued: When the Executive Committee of the Southern (Cape)
Section sought to express its alarm at rumours of the demise of Imperial
Preference in March 1955, the Northern Section vetoed its proposed telegram
e 3
 See ibid, as well as articles published in South African Mining and
Engineering Journal (henceforth SAMEJ) such as C. H. 0. Schaife (of St.
John's College, Oxford), "Free Trade and South Africa," SAMEJ, 35, Oct. 11
1924, 109-110.
e
* Letter from Bruwer to the Minister of Mines and Industries, May 6h 1926,
NA BTI 67/2. Capitals in original.
e s
 "Customs Policy and Dumping Duty: Interesting Debate at Harrismith
Congress," Commercial Bulletin, November 192^ », 88.
12
of protest to the government,a&
Given the clear threat that the new tariff implied for mining and large
sections of commercet the above reactions were hardly surprising. Yet the
desires and influence of the remaining key sections of capital, manufacturing
and agriculture, were by no means as straightforward as might have been
expected. Manufacturing capital* to be sure* hailed the election of the new
government. Full confidence was expressed in the new Minister of Mines and
Industry, Prime Minister Hertzog's statement that "to develop their
[manufacturers'] industries would be in consonance with the motto 'South
Africa First"1 was enshrined in a flagged box of the July 1924 issue of
Industrial South Africa, and Hertzog's remarks at the Eight Annual
Convention of the South African Federated Chambers of Industries (SAFCI) were
greeted with loud and sustained applause.2"7 Meanwhile the editors of
Industrial South Africa published guiding articles citing the benefits of
protection especially in light of the experience of the other Dominions.
In the battle of support for protection manufacturers were especially
concerned to demonstrate the benefits of protection for agriculture. As we
have seen» mining capital's case rested on the claim that free trade was
crucial to obtain access to export markets and maintain low prices for
foreign inputs. Manufacturers countered by holding forth the benefits of
growing backward and forward linkages between manufacturing and agriculture.
The development of the home market* via industrial development using local
material5i would thus expand the market for agriculture.eB Such efforts in
light of passage of the tariff should not be construed, however, as
indicating manufacturing's direct hand in the construction of the tariff.
Like other sectors of capital, manufacturing had little if any direct access
to the independent deliberations of the Board, something that manufacturing
capital complained of in private communication to the Minister of Mines and
Industries.e9
The response of agriculture's representatives to this wooing fluctuated
e
* ASSOCOM (Cape Town) archives, file A 1909, 1/1/5, Minutes of the Meeting
of the Executive Committee (Southern Section), Thursday 26th March 1925.
ay
 See Industrial South Africa, 19, 207, July 1924, 293 and the "Official
report of the Eighth Annual Convention," (Johannesburg and Cape town: SAFCIi
1925).
e s
 See for example, E. G. Saunders, "Agriculture and Manufacturing
Industries," Industrial South Africa, 19, 207, July 1924, 286.
B
* See the letter from Laite to the Minister of Mines and Industries, June 25
19H5, including the appended minutes of SAFCI meetings documenting the
Chamber's lack of access to the Board. NA BTI 67/7.
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over time. Executive members of the South African Agricultural Union (SAAU)
throughout the early 1920s aligned themselves with manufacturing capital. At
the 1921 Congress of the SAAU open support was declared for a new industrial
policy, and by 1922 the President of the SAAU was writing to the Chairman of
the Board of Trade and Industries that the SAUU had "full confidence" in the
Chamber of Industries and that the "Agricultural Union has accepted the
principle that industries must be fostered in South Africa".30 Yet only a
year later the Executive was forced to remind farmers of this "established"
support for manufacturing* arguing in the Farmers Weekly that
during 1922 South African manufacturers spent 26 and a half
millions sterling with the farmers of the country as against 28
millions received from the exportation of produce (exclusive of
gold and diamonds). It is therefore obvious that with the
extension of industries the home market will absorb a greater
volume of the products of the land. This being the case, it is
affirmed that it is to the advantage of farmers to support the
development of industries.3X
By the time of the passage of the 1925 Tariff Act other voices in the White
farming community expressed quite different views> reflecting divisions and
uncertainty as to the costs of the new tariff. Thus the Farmers Weekly
expressly editorialized against any alliance between the Chamber of
Industries and the Executive of the SAAU, and any extension of duties on
"articles essential to the proper conduct of farming".aE In this regard the
tariff was carefully constructed, avoiding increased tariffs on direct inputs
into the farming sector.
The deliberations and divisions among capital indicate both the hazards
and potentials of moving away from free trade towards industrialisation via
closing off selected commodity linkages to core areas of the world-economy.
Those producers most deeply entrenched in export production, and most
dependent upon seeking inputs at available world prices, properly fought
protection as an evil that could only lead to higher local costs and
potentially limited access to overseas markets. Mining capital clearly
figured predominantly here) yet this was also true of large sections of
commercial White agriculture. In a period of prosperity such forces could
have been expected to exert proper control over state policy in assuring the
continuation of the full set of conditions supporting a primary production.
The importance of the structural crisis of the early 1920s in undermining the
a o
 Letter from the President of the SAAU to Sir Howard George, Chairman of
the Board, May 11 1922, NA BTI 67/4.
31
 Farmers Weekly, 26, Oct. 10 1923,
B e
 Farmers Weekly, 29, May 6 1925, 803.
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strength of the opponenets of protection was critical: It both undermined
the benefits of long-standing commitment to this path of accumulation and
provided in part the political conditions that allowed a fundamental break to
occur in state policy.
Although a properly quantified estimation of the direct economic
effects of the 1985 Tariff remains to be established (and none will be
attempted here)» it is widely acknowledged that the rapid revival and
accelerated growth of industrial production rested upon the conditions
created by the new tariff. Contrary to most accounts! it bears noticing that
industrial growth in the period from the tariff to the Great Crash of 1929
was only but slightly less than the rate achieved in the expansive days after
the revaluation of gold in 1933 through the beginning of World War II.33
This mitigates strongly against the common view that the "miraculous" event
of 1933 marked the turning point in the transformation of South African
production and labour-force patterns. Since little in the way of tariff
reform was achieved after Fusion in 1933, and multiplier effects from the
expansion of the mining sector were considerable in the latter periodi the
achievements of the latter half of the 1920s stand out in considerable
relief.
If the new tariff served to restrain competition from more advanced
industrial areas overseas) it also broke at one and the same time the long-
standing British stranglehold on the import and export trade of the Union.
Such transitions in trade patterns reflected a broader range of actions
designed to break the colonial linkt ranging from the well-known battles over
flag and Dominion status, through German backing for ISCQR* to bilateral
trade treaties with Britain's competitors in the world market. In areas
where action by a weak international actor such as the South African state
could have immediate results these efforts could be decisive. In other
areasf such as attempts to stimulate more local control over capital markets
and the banking system — an area where the City of London's hold was still
strong, particularly on the South African Reserve Bank — the South African
state was far less successful. Overall) however, the fact that these
initiatives began in the 1920s gave South Africa a noted advantage over other
states which would attempt such policies only after the Great Crash, and thus
3 3
 Deflated net indutrial output between 1924/25 and 1929/30 rose by 63
percent) while between 1933/34 and 1938/39 a 60 percent increase was
recorded. Calculated from South Africa> Official Yearbook of the Union, No.
18, 1937 (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1937), and No. 24, 1948 (Pretoria:
Goverment Printer, 1950), 911 and 970 respectively for output figures, and
South Africa» Union Statistics for Fifty Years (Pretoria: Government
Printer, 1960), H-15 (for adjusted Union goods deflator).
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in much more adverse conditions. Indeed by contrast the boom inspired by the
revaluation of gold in 1933 lessened considerably the forces pushing for
increased protection* with the result that little if any further advance was
achieved in this domain beyond the positions attained during the 1920s.
IV
Attempts to establish industrial production through limiting competing
manufactured goods from core countries emerged as common theme in the
interwar period. Taking such action, it was argued, would increase both
inter-sectoral linkages and create a home market for locally produced goods.
In the instance of the South African tariff, however, the applicable arena
for such developments remained very much an open question. Raising tariff,
walls at the coast line did little to demarcate a South African market from
that of southern Africa. This was directly the result of already existing
agreements over the free flow of commodities) labour and capital across the
boundaries of the region. As indicated above, from 1903 onward customs
agreements between the constituent parts of South Africa, the Rhodesias, and
the High Commission territories assured the relatively unrestrained economic
exchanges within southern Africa as well as with overseas areas. British and
South African agreements with Portugal, and particularly Mozambique, further
cemented this pattern.
The intent behind South Africa's new tariff ran counter however to all
of these existing arrangements. On the one hand the continuation of free
trade within the region threatened the attempt by South Africans to promote
both the consumption of their own resources and the expansion of the home
market. On the other hand producers and consumers in surrounding
territories, if bound by the regulations of the new South African tariff,
faced higher commodity prices, and thus higher production and living costs,
without necessarily reaping any of the benefits of the tariff. In the years
following the passage of the tariff a series of struggles related to the
South African state's new initiatives thus took place throughout southern
Africa. The course and outcomes of these struggles reveal not only the
strengths of different colonial authorities and sections of capital, but also
the manner by which the basis for new forms of regional inequality were being
established. In order to illustrate this we examine in this section the
relationship between actors in South Africa and (1) Southern Rhodesia, (2)
Mozambique, and (3) the High Commission Territories.
Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there was
little conflict between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa over tariff
matters. Political authorities in both areas desired to maintain the lowest
16
possible costs for their primary producers* which dictated tariff schedules
constructed with only revenue considerations in mind. Southern Rhodesia's
first customs duties in 1899 corresponded closely to those of the existing
customs union between the Cape Colony, the Orange Free State'* Natal*
Basutoland, and Bechuanaland ,3** Formal consolidation of tariff structures
was finalized in the 1903 South African Customs Union referred to above* an
arrangement carried over in both the later customs agreements of 1906 and
1910. Further alterations in the South African tariff, most notably in 1914,
were similarly extended through new agreements between Southern Rhodesia and
South Africa. In all these cases South Africa's tariff stood for Southern
Rhodesia* South Africa collected duties on goods openly destined far Southern
Rhodesia, and free trade in the products of the participating parties was
guaranteed.
The existence of free trade between the two territories facilitated an
expanding exchange of products. In the decade after the 1914 agreement
Southern Rhodesia's exports to the Union grew by 600 percent* while imports
from the Union increased by 150 percent.aa Tobacco and cattle accounted for
the bulk of Southern Rhodesia's exports, while imports from South Africa were
dominated by a wide variety of processed foodstuffs arid consumer goods.
Incipient inequalities were clearly at work as settler farmers in Southern
Rhodesia increasingly looked to South Africa's large urban and mining
markets, while Southern Rhodesia in turn rose as an outlet for South Africa's
manufac turers.
The South African state's turn to protection and the development of
local industries and markets seriously challenged these long-standing
arrangements. Following past practice, Southern Rhodesia agreed to the
radically new nomenclature and duties of South Africa's 1955 tariff, subject
to the right to set Imperial Preference rebates above the levels contained in
the Union tariff. In reality Southern Rhodesian merchants bypassed the
higher costs imposed by Imperial Preference by simply importing indirectly
from warehouses in South Africa* the Union government agreed to pay Southern
Rhodesia no less than £ 125,000 in recompense. Throughout such deliberations
there was not only a clear sense of growing divergence between the two states
over tariff matters but also a declining ability of Southern Rhodesia to
3
* See D. J. J. Botha, "On Tariff Policy: the Formative Years," South
African Journal of Economics* 41, 4, Dec. 1973, 321-55, as well as official
accounts in Southern Rhodesia Official Yearbook, nos. 1 & 2, 1924, 1930.
3 3
 Calculated from Southern Rhodesia, Official Yearbook of the Colony of
Southern Rhodesia, No. 2, 1930 (Salisbury: Rhodesian Printing and Publishing
Co, 1930), 627-8.
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control the pattern and revenues of commodity trade.
Far more serious conflicts arose as the South African government sought
to restrict access to its markets and growing industries by surrounding
peripheral producers as well as overseas producers. Strains between South
Africa and Southern Rhodesia had been growing for some timei as the turn to
agricultural production in Southern Rhodesia led to an acceleration of
agricultural exports to the Union. The central items at issue were the
cattle and tobacco exports of Southern Rhodesia. In 1924 the Union
government pressed Southern Rhodesian officials to accept limits on these
exports and succeeded: minimum weight limits of 1,050 lbs. for oxen and 750
lbs. for cows were imposedi while the export of lower grades of tobacco
(scrap, dust, and stems) were prohibited altogether. Pact Ministers
trumpeted such results to South African farmers, proclaiming that 750,000
lbs. of tobacco had been excluded by these measures.3& Weight restrictions
on cattle, however, seemed primarily designed against the smaller cattle of
African farmers. As one South African MP put it, he "did not know of a
cattle farmer in the Transvaal who would be satisfied with the agreement".37
Such restrictions, when placed in light of continued access to Southern
Rhodesia on the part of South Africa's growing manufacturing sector,
considerably exacerbated the unevenness of the trading relationship between
the two territories. This was graphically reflected in an accelerating trade
imbalance through the rest of the 1920s:
Southern Rhodesian Trade with South Africa39
Year Exports Imports Exports/Imports
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
738
540
836
1074
894
832
825
783
1197
1317
1550
1750
90
69
70
90
58
48
If invisible imports and exports were included the balance in South Africa's
3<b
 Farmers weekly, 28, March 4 1925, 2602.
3 7
 Ibid.
3 e
 Sources: Southern Rhodesia, Official Yearbook, Nos. 2, 1930, and 3, 1932
(Salisbury: Rhodesian Printing and Publishing, 1930, 1932), 617 and 548, 558
respectively. These figures exclude gold movements between the two
countries, specifically Rhodesian gold sent to the new Rand refinery.
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favor would have been much greateri perhaps even double the official
figure.3' The character of the trade confirmed, moreover) the different
bases of accumulation, with Southern Rhodesia exporting primary products to
South Africa and receiving manufactures in return. Nothing illustrated this
better than the export of Southern Rhodesian tobacco which returned in the
form of South African cigarettes.
In face of such trends the Southern Rhodesian government in March 1929
requested a revision of the customs agreement reached in 1925. The Southern
Rhodesian government stated its demands quite openly: more tariff autonomy*
a closure of tariff loopholes presented by the disguised importation of
overseas goods from open stocks in the Union, a securing of Imperial
Preference, and the prevention of the automatic extension to Southern
Rhodesia of the Union's growing trade treaties with foreign powers. The last
two items» and indeed the whole question of revision, was triggered by the
South African-German trade treaty of 1929. Meetings between state officials
soon ended in complete deadlock. The reason was not hard to discern: Far
from recognizing Southern Rhodesian complaints, the South Africans used the
occasion to increase their already considerable advantages. In addition to
retaining previous limits on lower grades of tobacco and cattle, it was now
proposed that tobacco imports were to be limited to a maximum import quota of
2,000,000 lbs. of Virginia leaf and 400,000 lbs. of Turkish leaf. At the
same time South African officials expected to retain the applicability of
South Africa's protectionist duties as well as free access for South African
manufacturers.
On the Southern Rhodesian side of the border expectations that the lack
of any agreement would benefit the growth of Southern Rhodesian industry
quickly gave way to a recognition of the necessity of maintaining even
limited access to the South African market.'*0 Reaction in South Africa was
mixed, reflecting a greater variety of relationships to Southern Rhodesia and
the wider world-economy. Those most immediately affected by the lack of any
a
* No accounting of these items was made at the time. One Southern Rhodesian
Commission in the early 1930s calculated, on the basis of figures supplied by
the Controller of Customs and the Government Statistician, that invisible
trade items doubled the trade balance in South Africa's favor. See Southern
Rhodesia, Ottawa Conference: Report of the Committee Appointed to
Investigate and Report to the Government (Salisbury: Government Printer,
1932), CSR 1-1933, 26-7.
**° Ian Phimister, "Industrialisation in the Periphery! Southern Rhodesian
and South African Trade Relations between the Wars," African Studies
Institute, Seminar Paper, 28 July 1986, 6-8. Phimister's essay complements
our argument here by providing a detailed accounting of trade relations as
seen from the Southern Rhodesian side of the border. It also demonstrates
the advantages of free access to the appropriate Ministerial archives.
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customs agreement! the commercial community, presented a detailed memorandum
to the government affirming the just demands of Southern Rhodesia."1
Representatives of manufacturing capitali defending access to a major market)
chided the Southern Rhodesians for expecting to develop secondary industries
and pointed out the benefits of a lower cost of living that resulted from
free trade with South Africa. Conveniently forgotten was the application of
this type of argument in relation to South Africa.**e Mining capital
predictably endorsed the resolution of the Rhodesian Chamber of Mines which
called for reciprocity and free interstate trade.**3 In support of this
position they raised the spectre of Southern Rhodesia emerging as a
competitor to South African industry:
If Union manufactures are heavily taxed at the border, will not
capital be transferred from here to carry on factories in
Rhodesia? Many of our manufacturers are said to sell sixty
percent of their products in Rhodesia... From all points of view,
the Union has everything to lose and nothing to gain by failing
to come to terms with Rhodesia,****
The Farmers Weekly for its part exposed the duality of the relationship with
Southern Rhodesia* pointing out that Union tobacco men might gain the
internal market if Rhodesian tobacco was eventually excluded* but would "feel
the rebound from the blow that will fall on the Union's tobacco manufacturing
industry".*»° In addition the curtailment of access to the Southern Rhodesian
market was likely to have "a serious adverse effect upon the Natal sugar
trade, as well as upon wine and other agricultural products" .*•*
The agreement reached in 1930 once more demonstrated the strength of
the South African state's hand: South African producers retained generous
access to the Southern Rhodesian market while Southern Rhodesian producers
were circumscribed from competing in the South African market. Imports into
the Union of Southern Rhodesian beef, scrub cattle* and the lower grades of
tobacco were prohibited, while the higher grades of tobacco were limited to
2,400,000 lbs. a year. Southern Rhodesia's increases on a selected group of
South African imports (tobacco, spirits, and motor vehicles) were minimal,
and duties were set at rates lower then those applied to even Great Britain.
** Commercial Bulletin, 7, 82, Nov. 1939, 201, 203.
**
B
 Industrial and Commercial South Africa* 24, Oct. 1929, 515.
**
3
 South African Mining and Engineering Journali 40, Dec. 14 1929, 403.
***+ South African Mining and Engineering Journal, 40, Oct. 26 1929, 215.
*
a
 Farmers Meekly, 38, Oct. 2 1929, 205.
** ibid.
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Other minor Southern Rhodesian gainsi such as the ability to frame its own
tariffs in respect of other goods and receive import duties on goods imported
from Union stocks (versus the earlier flat 12 percent rate) hardly offset the
advantages attained by South Africa.
No sooner had the ink dried on the 1930 agreement than Southern
Rhadesians once again began to decry the inequity of their customs relation
with South Africa. In the mid-1930s a decisive break finally occurred, with
Southern Rhodesia ending its participation in the Customs Union and
constructing its own tariff schedules. As Phimister has shown, however,
these efforts were undertaken with the aim of defining the Southern Rhodesian
market as a basis for bargaining overseas acceptance of Southern Rhodesian
exports.'*'7 While this created some space for Southern Rhodesian
manufacturers to expand, it was clear that the protection of primary
producers was uppermost in the government's calculations and would remain so
throughout the rest of the interwar period. Pressed too far by the South
Africans, Southern Rhodesia retreated into the Empire.
No other territory in southern Africa presented to South Africa as
lucrative a market or as large a competitive threat as Southern Rhodesia.
Yet relations between South Africa and other territories would suffer the
same strains and pressures throughout the interwar period as had emerged
between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. What served to distinguish other
territories, however, was both the nature of their economic interchanges with
South Africa and the political powers that controlled them. Together these
factors carried interstate struggles to quite distinctive conclusions.
In the instance of Mozambique South Africa confronted not a settler
power, but rather the political and economic interests of metropolitan
Portugal. As one of the most underdeveloped countries in Europe, Portugal
was barely able to retain formal control of her African colonies in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century. Subordination to Great Britain, in
exchange for support of Portuguese colonial claims* did not always lead to
the intended result in Portuguese East Africa. Once Union was established,
and Smuts emerged as a confidant of the British establishment, British and
South African interests began to override the Portuguese-British alliance.
Brazen efforts by Smuts to undermine the Portuguese hold over Mozambique* and
deepen its dependence on South Africa, were surreptiously if not always
Ian Phimister, "Industrialisation in the Periphery," 13.
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openly supported by Britain and British capital.*8
Mozambique's importance to South African capital was to be found in
three areas: (1) the provisioning of labour to the South Africa's gold and
coal mines and sugar plantations* <2) Louren^o Marque's status as the nearest
port to the Rand, and (3) the exchange of commodities produced by the two
areas. During the opening decade of the century a series of agreements had
cemented the rules regulating these relationships. Particularly important
was the 1901 modus vivendi arranged by Milneri which in turn for labour
recruiting rights guaranteed both pre-war railway flows and the free entry of
Mozambican goods - much to the fury of both the Cape and Natal. Confirmed in
1909 by the Transvaal government, this agreement basically continued through
the Union years. When it came up for renewal in 1923 Smuts' demands knew no
bounds, with the result that the agreement lapsed. Portuguese officials did
however agree to continue to allow the lucrative labour recruiting, viewing
South African mining capital as their natural ally.
The Pact government thus confronted a situation where free trade no
longer existed between Mozambique and South Africa, where no percentage of
the Rand's railway traffic was assured to Mozambique, and where access to
Mozambican labour was nevertheless still assured. There were significant
advantages to South Africa in having this situation extended, particularly in
light of the Pact government's new attitude to foreign trade relations.
Indeed attempts to negotiate a new agreement in 19S5 and 1926 foundered on
the South African demand that protection be upheld and Mozambican goods
excluded from free access to the South African market. In the end the
Portuguese precipitated hard bargaining by announcing in 1927 the termination
of the labour agreement.
Unlike its predecessors, the Pact government approached negotiations
without any predatory eye over southern Mozambique.**9 Nationalists had
*
B
 Among other efforts Smuts threatened to seize Lourenco Marques, proposed a
federation including Mozambique, offered to run the port and railroad under
South African auspices, etc. While these came to nought, Smuts* ability to
bend to good use the British connection to enforce Mozambique's dependence on
South Africa was illustrated by his successful blocking of a badly needed
British loan. See among others Malyn Newitt, Portugal in Africa (London:
Longmans, 1981), 35ff and Simon Katzenellenbogen, South Africa and Southern
Mozambique: Labour Railroads, and Trade in the Making of a Relationship
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982).
** This reversal of policy is curiously unnoticed and untreated in the
literature that covers South Africa's relationships with her neighbors.
Ronald Hyam, for example, presents a story of continuity in South African
expansionism (see his The Failure of South African Expansionism 1908-194B
(New York: Africana, 1972)). Katzenellenbogen, op. cit., who had access to
the''South African Prime Minister's archives before they were closed to
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little interest in creating a broader British sphere of influence) while
Labour Party members took the fierce line that Mozambican labour should be
eliminated entirely over a period of four to six years.30 There was little
prospect of the latter line succeeding. The replacement of such a large body
of miners in so short a time was impracticable even if one could overlook the
crisis of profitability in the mining sector. Negotiations in Lisbon in
early 1928 led to a new convention being finalized in Pretoria in September.
When the contours of the convention became available it was clear no simple
modification of past agreements had taken place. Labour recruitment was
assured but took new form: a 25 percent drop in the maximum number of gold
miners over the course of the next five years was dictated* only the gold
mines were allowed to recruit* and the length of contracts was strictly -
regulated. Mining capital's reaction was swift:
It is unfortunately the case that* in place of safeguarding our
supply of labouri the hew agreement seriously prejudices the
position of the mines. The reduction of our maximum number of
East Coast Natives form a total of nearly 110*000 to 80,000...
over a period of five years in it itself sufficiently serious!
but a closer study of the terms as to re-engagement makes it
tolerably certain that it will not be possible to maintain even
the maximum number laid down.31
To such voices were added those of sugar planters in Natal who were excluded
from recruiting and who feared increased competition for the remaining pool
of South African Black labour.ae In the case of mining capital the
transition to boom conditions after 1933* coupled with the outflow of Black
labour from South Africa's countryside* resolved labour supply problems.
Sugar interests by contrast found relief in another quarter. Sugar
prices had fallen from £ 30/ton in the early 1920s to £ 21-22 by 1925-26.oa
Whereas previous conventions had allowed the free import of tiozambican sugar
the new convention simply guaranteed Mozambique equal treatment to other
nations. In ensuing years Mozambican sugar thus became subject to rising
duties imposed against all overseas producers.
Other commodity imports from Mozambique fell subject to similar
restrictions during the Pact years. Most interesting of all was the case of
researchers* but briefly captures this change.
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cement* where South African interests were poised on both sides of the
border. Formed in 1919, the Mozambique Portland Cement Company had an
exclusive right to produce cement in Mozambique. The firm was however South
African by birthright* being registered in the Orange Free State,
headquartered in Johannesburg* and owned by a majority of shareholders of
South African origin.0* In the face of a doubling of imports as a percentage
of South African production between 1984 and 1926»sa the Board of Trade and
Industries succeeded in having duties raised against cement imports form
twelve countries* including Mozambique.s& Far from supporting the expansion
of South African capitali the state constrained capital within its own
borders.
South Africa's actions vis-a-vis the High Commission Territories during
the interwar period contrast quite sharply with the treatment rendered to
Southern Rhodesia and Mozambique. The reason for this was simple: from the
earliest days of the century until the early 1960s South African officials
presumed the Territories would be incorporated into the Union. By the First
World War the Territories' trade* transport and banking systems were
completely integrated with South Africa's. Imports from or through South
Africa were largely composed of clothing, household goods, and agricultural
supplies, while commodity exports took the form of primary products such as
wool (especially from Basutoland)* cattle and stock products (especially
Bechuanaland), and in the case of Swaziland* cassiterite tin. Above these
stood the issue of the supply of migrant labour. The Territories not only
offered an alternative source of supply to Mozambique* for example* but also
held forth the promise — if incorporated — of relieving the pressure for
the expansion settler farming and/or the creation of Native Reserves as
called for the by 1913 Native Land Act. The experience of South West Africa*
within the confines of the mandate given to South Africa after the First
World War, illustrated such possibilities: a rapid emigration of White South
African farmers took place, with the White population of South West Africa
doubling between 1914 and 1925 despite the repatriation of 6,000 Germans.o>7
When Hertzog came to power in 1924 He immediately, and ineptly, pushed
=
** See Board of Trade and Industries, "Report No. 48: Dumping Duty on
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Great Britain for the transfer of Swaziland, and if possible Bechuanaland, to
the Union. Such efforts failed in the face of British intransigence:
British officials were ill-disposed to meet the demands of the
"anti-imperialist" Hertzog. South African policy towards the Territories
during the rest of the interwar period thus vacillated between acceptance of
the Territories as full economic partners and resentment at the lack of an
immediate ability to bring them under South Africa's direct rule. While
labour migration expanded, the exports of the Territories were harried by
South African policy. Cattle exports were particularly notable* with the
restrictions placed on Southern Rhodesian cattle in 1924 being shortly
applied to the Territories as well. As Ettinger has shown in the case of
£echuanaland, such a limitation applied primarily to the lower-weight cattle
of African farmers* and did indeed have a significant effect upon cattle
exports to the Union.se
V
By the end of World War II the Board of Trade and Industry could
proclaim that "the Union is clearly not just entering the industrial stage.
On the contrary, the industrial development of the country is well
advanced".39 In 1918 manufacturing's contribution to GDP was but £9 percent
of the contribution of agriculture and 39 percent of mining; by 1945
manufacturing had surpassed both mining and agriculture as the primary
contributer to GDP.AO Figures advanced by the Board showed that industry and
national income grew more rapidly in South Africa than in many countries,
including Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.61
As elsewhere along the periphery of the world-economy, such
achievements rested upon the application of protectionist measures in a
climate of rivalry in the interstate system, depression in the world-economy
as a whole, and the breakup of the world market after the Great Crash. The
reorientation of South African commodity exchanges is well indicated by trade
figures. Seeking to establish national autonomy over commodity production, a
first step was eliminate open access to the national market. In what was
s e
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known as British South Africa) the displacement of British hegemony was
decisive. South Africa's moves towards protection were thus matched by a
necessary break from the philosophy and practices of free trade and Imperial
Preference. From the time of the creation of Union through the end of the
First World War Britain had encapsulated over fifty percent of South Africa's
import trade and fifty to seventy-five percent of the non-gold export
trade.*e These figures steadily dropped throughout the interwar period. By
the eve of the Second World War Britain's share of the import trade was
headed for less than 40 percent) while exports to Britain had fallen to
around a 35 percent share. These trends stood in sharp contrast to the case
of Southern Rhodesia) where Britain's import and export shares rose through
the interwar period) particularly in the 1930s. A similar development took
place in Mozambique after the reassertion of metropolitan control in the
early 1930s.63
A further outcome of South Africa's resistance to being encapsulated
within the colonial embrace can only be termed the end of southern Africa as
an area marked by open economic flows. As we have shown above, the pursuit
of national productive priorities pushed South African policy in a direction
that restricted imports from neighboring states. As the Southern Rhodesian
case indicates? this in turn drove neigboring territories towards closer
links with colonial powers. If at the beginning of the interwar period
southern Africa was marked by a relatively free interchange of labour,
capital, and commodities) by World War II these types of exchanges took place
within very tight and restricted channels. In this sense actual and
potential economic activity in southern Africa became less related and less
integrated. At the same time the disparity between the weight and kinds of
economic activities undertaken in the region grew larger as South Africa
*
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rapidly industrialised. Basic import/export balances indicated this* as
neighboring territories imported far more from South Africa than they
exported to her.
In retrospect interwar developments laid the foundation for post-World
War II South African hegemony in the region. For if the interwar period
marked the radical transition from a phase of open economic exchanges to one
of restricted and declining linkages across the area, the postwar period was
to witness the expanded importance of South Africa for all the territories of
the region. In this regard it would be most misleading to extrapolate
interwar policies and patterns through the post-war period to the present.
The establishment of U.S. hegemony in the interstate system, the re-ordering
of the world-economy on the basis of the free penetration of capital (the
Free Enterprise System vs. the Free Trade System), and the transition to a
long expansionary period throughout the world-economy reposed the conditions
and institutions underwriting core-peripheral linkages. At the simplest
level such an environment dictated the declining potential of "delinking"
from imperial forces as had been undertaken during the interwar period. In
short order the South African state's committed itself to all the basic
treaties and institutions of this new world order. There were to be
significant advantages to this strategy for capital and the state, and this
was nowhere more marked than within southern Africa. Moving forward from the
basis of the most advanced economic area in Africa* South Africa emerged as
the locus, in alliance with multinational captialj for supplying advanced
industrial goods, services, and capital for all of southern Africa. Far from
the separate parts of southern Africa being linked to individual colonial
powers* as was increasingly the case during the interwar period, the postwar
conjuncture saw for the first time substantive core-periphery type relations
within the area itself. It is in effect this historically-specific construct
that underlies the present reality of interdependence in southern Africa
today. Whether the region so created can survive both new global forces —
particularly a new phase of global depression and the virulent reassertion of
core domination — and the increasing regional resistance to South African
domination! remains to be seen — and analysed.
